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Abstract 
 
This article is a legal and policy analysis of two international trade disputes fora, namely the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), for 
countries that have standing in both jurisdictions, i.e., the United Mexican States, the United 
States of America, and Canada. Both fora are judicially compared from the perspective of the 
respondent and of the complainant, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of each forum.
The chosen time-frame of judicial analysis is between 1995 and 2001. The article concludes with 
two cases which may have been brought in either forum, Broomcorn and Canada – Patent Term,
and recommends that, for the future, the Party concerned in international trade disputes would 
need to look at the factors compositely on a case-specific basis to determine whether a dispute 
should be brought under the WTO or the NAFTA. 
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Introduction 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 reformulated and institutionalized as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)2 in 1994, has provided much of the framework through which 
 
1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947, was created by the Bretton Woods meetings that 
took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (U.S.), in 1944, setting out a plan for economic recovery after World 
War II, by encouraging reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers. The GATT is one of the three 
mechanisms for global economic governance established at Bretton Woods, being the other two the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The GATT was a collection of rules applied temporarily, without an 
institutional basis, unlike the WTO, which is a permanent organization with a permanent framework and its own 
Secretariat. For almost fifty years, the GATT focused exclusively on trade in goods, leaving tariffs and quotas aside 
in the various rounds of negotiations of the world trading system. The GATT set the terms for countries who wanted 
to trade with each other. The GATT signatories were called “contracting parties.” The Uruguay Round, completed in 
1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global trade agency with binding enforcements of comprehensive rules 
expanding beyond trade. The GATT has now become one of the eighteen agreements enforced by the WTO. 
2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a global trade agency that was established through the GATT Uruguay 
Round Agreement signed in 1994. The WTO provides dispute resolution, administration, and continuing 
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international trade has flourished for over fifty years. The post-War philosophy of trade 
liberalization has also paved the way to the creation of regional trade agreements.3
Regional and multilateral4 trade arrangements have promoted this growth in trade with 
the creation of institutions and procedures, particularly dispute settlement systems, through 
which signatories can ensure and enforce predictable and stable business environments for their 
citizens. During negotiations, state actors formulate institutions and structures within the 
agreements to enable the dispute settlement processes which may be most effective in resolving 
these disputes. The primary purpose of dispute settlement systems in international trade 
agreements is to “guarantee respect for the agreement(s), in responding to violations and 
 
negotiations for the seventeen substantive agreements that it enforces. The WTO and its underlying agreements set a 
system of comprehensive governance that goes far beyond trade rules. It is argued by some commentators (Lori 
Wallach being one of the most relevant activists in the public domain) that the WTO system, rules, and procedures 
are undemocratic and non-transparent. The WTO’s substantive rules systematically prioritize trade over all other 
goals and values. Each WTO member is required to ensure “the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures” [WTO Agreement Article XVI (4)] to the WTO’s substantive rules. National policies 
and laws found to violate WTO rules must be eliminated or changed; otherwise, the violating country faces trade 
sanctions. The economic, social and environmental upheaval being suffered by many countries that have lived under 
the WTO regime since 1995 means that business-as-usual at the WTO is over. It remains to be seen whether the 
handful of powerful WTO members who have dictated WTO policy since 1995 will adapt to the new reality. By the 
same token, it is also unclear whether countries demanding changes to the WTO’s current system of rules that are 
damaging their national interests may begin to withdraw if those changes do not take place. Regarding withdrawal 
from the WTO Agreement, although Article XV (1) is clear and reads that “Any Member may withdraw from this 
Agreement. Such withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall 
take effect upon the expiration of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the 
Director-General of the WTO,” the withdrawal from certain rules or agreements is not entirely clear. 
3 Regional trade agreements under GATT Article XXIV have effects of trade creation as well as of trade diversion. 
Trade creation has resulted from the expansion of trade with efficient suppliers within the free trade or customs 
union area while trade diversion could be found as there might be a shift in trade from efficient suppliers outside the 
RTA to those inside just to get the benefit from the trade preferences. But, I would argue that the creation of regional 
trade agreements can have a significantly positive effect on the growth of world trade and the willingness of 
countries to subsequently make the concessions they have already done through their regional trade arrangement 
multilaterally. As entities, regional trade areas can be constructive to liberal principles if they do not turn inwards
and do not place undue restrictions on trade with other WTO nations.
4 In the WTO context, multilateral negotiations, as opposed to plurilateral negotiations, imply the participation of all 
WTO members. The nature of the consequent multilateral agreements from these multilateral negotiations implies 
that commitments are taken by all the WTO members. The GATT was a multilateral instrument as well, but a series 
of new agreements were adopted during the Tokyo Round on a multilateral (selective) basis, which caused a 
fragmentation of the multilateral trading system. 
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legitimate expectations under such agreements.”5 The existence of rules, however, is not the only 
factor determining whether a dispute settlement system is effective.  
The political will, a calculus of the numerous domestic and international interests, of 
states to undertake the legal obligations of a trading system determines the effectiveness of the 
institutions created. Furthermore, although the political will of the states may support the 
institutional framework that has been negotiated, the political will to resolve any particular 
dispute determines whether and how it will be resolved. The available data thus seems to support 
Robert Hudec’s proposition regarding the importance of political will in determining the 
effectiveness of international legal systems derived from the GATT experience.6 He has stated 
that “political will is really more important than rigorously binding procedures – that strong 
procedures by themselves are not likely to make a legal system effective if they do not have the 
sufficient political will behind them.”7
The importance of political will to the effectiveness of the dispute settlement rules of the 
WTO and the Chapter 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)8 will be 
 
5 Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic 
Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of the World Trade Organization in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). 
6 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999).  
7 Id., at 11.  
8 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a radical experiment in rapid deregulation of trade and 
investment among the U.S, Mexico, and Canada. Since 1995, NAFTA is considered the symbol of the failed 
corporate globalization model because its results for most people in all three countries have been negative: real 
wages are lower and millions of jobs have been lost; farm income is down and farm bankruptcies are up; 
environmental and health conditions along the U.S.-Mexico boarder have declined; and a series of environmental 
and other public interest standards have been attacked under NAFTA. NAFTA’s agricultural provisions have been 
so extreme that Mexican family farmers are demanding a re-negotiation or nullification of the treaty, after its first 
phase of initial implementation led to displacement of millions of Mexican farmers. NAFTA represents the gold 
standard of corporate rights in trade and investment agreements because it includes hitherto unheard of corporate 
privileges, including investor-to-state dispute resolutions, which is the right to sue governments for cash 
compensation in closed trade tribunals over regulatory costs. This right, contained in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on 
investment, has been used by numerous multinational corporations to seek financial compensation for public health 
and safety, or environmental regulations that corporations argue amount to expropriation of their current or future 
lost profits. NAFTA Chapter 11 corporate suits have resulted in the lifting of a Canadian ban on a toxic chemical as 
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examined in this article.9 In the WTO, where the dispute settlement procedures appear to be rule-
oriented,10 as displayed in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU),11 there has been an effective compliance record overall. However, in 
politically sensitive cases, compliance has been slow or nonexistent, and there has been a 
growing use of Article 21.512 Panels.13 The NAFTA Chapter 20, the sole government-to-
 
well as an attack on a similar California state toxic chemical ban, and the payout of U.S. $16 million by waste dump 
to be built on ecologically protected land. 
9 As we will see later, the principal dispute settlement mechanisms of the NAFTA are found in Chapter 11, Chapter 
19, and Chapter 20. 
10 For discussion on rule-oriented as opposed to power-oriented diplomacy, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM : LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109-11 
(2nd ed., 2000). 
11 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is one of the most important new features of the WTO. The DSU 
established a system of review and procedures for when one of the WTO members complains that the actions or 
policies of another member have harmed it through a violation of WTO rules. Typically, a complaint would be 
followed by consultations, possible arbitration, then the formation of a panel of experts, the panel ruling, possible 
appeal to the Appellate Body, and, based on the outcome of the case, either compliance, compensation to the 
complaining country, or eventual retaliation. The WTO’s system of settling disputes provides for specific deadlines, 
and is therefore quicker than the old GATT system. Its type of functioning is more automatic, which reduces the 
number of blockages compared to the GATT system. The rules concerning the establishment of the findings’ 
process are more detailed than they were under the GATT system. Panel reports and Appellate Body rulings can be 
overturned only by a unanimous vote of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is a WTO body that rules on 
dispute settlement cases under the DSU. The DSB consists of all members of the WTO General Council, that is to 
say, all WTO members’ representatives in Geneva, who oversee the operation of all of the constituent WTO 
Agreements in general. The DSB rules on actions taken under the DSU. 
12 The locution “Article 21.5 Panel” refers to Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which reads:  
 
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to 
comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute 
settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its report 
within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it.  When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report 
within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of 
the period within which it will submit its report. 
13 As an overview of the WTO disputes resolved by the DSB rulings and recommendations, we acknowledge that 
there were a total of 52 matters and 68 complaints in the DSB between 1995 and 2001. Among other categories, 
apart from the cases which had negative rulings or the time-period for implementation had not been determined or 
had not yet expired, 27 matters and 38 complaints had expired time periods for implementation. Ten matters and 18 
complaints had completed implementation, but the remaining disputes had had some implementation problems, such 
as extensive resorts to 21.5 Panels. The following cases used 21.5 proceedings: Australia - Subsidies provided to 
producers and exporters of automotive leather (WT/DS126); Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft 
(WT/DS46); Canada – Aircraft (WT/DS 70); Korea - Semiconductor (WT/DS99); Canada — Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products (WT/DS103, 113); EC – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale, and Distribution of Bananas (WT/26, 27); Mexico – Anti-dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) (WT/DS132); Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (WT/DS18); United States - Tax 
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" (WT/DS108);  and United States - Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58). EC – Hormones went to a 22.6 Panel because there had been non-
implementation. 
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government dispute settlement mechanism in the NAFTA, is geared to bilateral, negotiated 
resolutions as there are fewer detailed rules governing the procedures and implementations of 
rulings.14 Until 2001, there were three completed cases in the NAFTA Chapter 2015 (a fourth had 
begun soon thereafter16), two of which have required compliance measures.17 The two cases have 
involved politically sensitive issues and have had some compliance difficulties.18 While the 
empirical data on the success of both dispute settlement systems, respectively, is limited due to 
their relatively short period of existence, both the NAFTA Chapter 20 and the WTO dispute 
settlement systems illustrate that, in cases where there are politically sensitive issues, the 
effectiveness of the systems is dependent on the political will of the losing party to comply rather 
than on the complexity of the existing rules.  
Within this political framework, there are cases that could be brought in either the WTO 
or the NAFTA Chapter 20 forum. The NAFTA party will of course choose the forum in which it 
calculates it has the best chance to win and compel the other side to change or remove its 
injurious measures. This article will argue that, in cases where forum shopping is possible, there 
 
14 The dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 20 are applicable to all disputes regarding the interpretation or 
application of the NAFTA. The steps set out in Chapter 20 are intended to resolve disputes by agreement, if at all 
possible. The process begins with government-to-government (the Parties) consultations. If the dispute is not 
resolved, a Party may request a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (comprised of the Trade Ministers 
of the Parties). If the Commission is unable to resolve the dispute, a consulting Party may call for the establishment 
of a five-member arbitral panel. 
Chapter 20 also provides for scientific review boards which may be selected by a panel, in consultation 
with the disputing Party, to provide a written report on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or 
other scientific matters to assist panels in rendering their decisions. As well, disputes relating to the following 
chapters may be referred to dispute settlement procedures under Chapter 20:  
• Chapter 7 (Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures); 
• Chapter 10 (Government Procurement);  
• Chapter 11 (Non-compliance of a Party with a final award); and 
• Chapter 14 (Financial Services). 
15 Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products (CDA-95-2008-01) (hereinafter 
Canadian Agricultural Products) (Panel decision, December 2, 1996); U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn 
Brooms from Mexico (USA-97-2008-01) (hereinafter Broomcorn) (Panel decision, January 30, 1998); Cross-Border 
Trucking Services and Investment (USA-98-2008-01) (hereinafter Trucking) (Panel decision, February 6, 2001). 
16 Cross-Border Bus Services (USA-98-2008-02). 
17 The U.S. unsuccessfully challenged Canadian tariffs in Canadian Agricultural Products.
18 Broomcorn case and Trucking. 
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are no set, determinative factors that dictate the proper forum for any particular dispute, despite 
the differences in complexity of the rules. Instead, each dispute has to be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis. However, this article will make recommendations on the factors that the parties 
should take into account to decide on the proper forum. First, in order to make this comparison, 
Part I will look at the background, institutional structures, and record of the WTO and the 
NAFTA dispute settlement systems. Second, Part II will present a comparison of the advantages 
and disadvantages of each system from the perspective of complaining and respondent parties. 
On the basis of the discussion in the previous two sections, the article will conclude with 
suggestions of specific factors which might affect the choice of forum in which forum shopping 
is possible.  
 
I. An Overview of the WTO and the NAFTA 
A. Background
The WTO Dispute Settlement system has its roots in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which provided a procedural platform for dispute settlement and established 
guiding principles for periodic multilateral negotiations on a product-by-product basis. The 
NAFTA, on the other hand, was a far more ambitious project that, in many ways, had the benefit 
of over 40 years of GATT dispute settlement, as well as the example of regional integration and 
dispute settlement in the European Community. Whereas the GATT was prototypical and 
evolved piecemeal over time, the NAFTA’s drafters were concerned about the potential for a 
regional dispute settlement system to intrude on national sovereignty and sought to limit its 
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extent. For this reason, the NAFTA Articles 201719 and 201820 are considered to provide a soft 
resolution to disputes, a fair contrast even to the definitive language of GATT Article XXIII:2,21 
as later elaborated upon by the DSU. This section will look at the background of both systems 
and then compare their institutional structures. 
 
19 NAFTA Article 2017 reads: 
1. The panel shall present to the disputing Parties a final report, including any separate opinions on matters not 
unanimously agreed, within 30 days of presentation of the initial report, unless the disputing Parties otherwise agree.  
2. No panel may, either in its initial report or its final report, disclose which panelists are associated with majority or 
minority opinions.  
3. The disputing Parties shall transmit to the Commission the final report of the panel, including any report of a 
scientific review board established under Article 2015, as well as any written views that a disputing Party desires to 
be appended, on a confidential basis within a reasonable period of time after it is presented to them.  
4. Unless the Commission decides otherwise, the final report of the panel shall be published 15 days after it is 
transmitted to the Commission. 
20 NAFTA Article 2018 reads: 
1. On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which 
normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel, and shall notify their Sections of 
the Secretariat of any agreed resolution of any dispute.  
2. Wherever possible, the resolution shall be non-implementation or removal of a measure not conforming with this 
Agreement or causing nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004 or, failing such a resolution, 
compensation. 
21 GATT Article XXIII:2 reads: 
 
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the 
difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to 
them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or 
give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, 
with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental 
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary.  If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider 
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to 
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this 
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.  If the application to any contracting party of 
any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty 
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary21 to the Contracting Parties of its 
intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the 
day on which such notice is received by him. 
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As mentioned above, GATT Articles XXII22 and XXIII23 have provided the basis for the 
WTO Dispute Settlement system which exists today. In 1947, the treaty text, however, stipulated 
only a loosely-structured organization through which the parties were to address their conflicts.24 
22 GATT Article XXII reads: 
 
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for 
consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter 
affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
 
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any contracting 
party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through 
consultation under paragraph 1. 
23 GATT Article XXIII reads: 
 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded 
as the result of 
 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, 
or 
 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts 
with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
 
(c) the existence of any other situation,  
 
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or 
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting party thus 
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it. 
 
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, 
or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to 
them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or 
give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, 
with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental 
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary.  If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider 
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to 
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this 
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.  If the application to any contracting party of 
any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty 
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary23 to the Contracting Parties of its 
intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the 
day on which such notice is received by him. 
24 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999), at 2. 
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Instead, the Contracting Parties developed their processes and practices for dispute resolution 
over the years.25 
From 1948 to 1978, the GATT dispute settlement procedures were primarily 
diplomatically based comprising of few standardized procedures, vague legal rulings, and 
negotiated outcomes.26 At first, the Contracting Parties had their disputes considered during their 
plenary semiannual meetings.27 Later, ad hoc working parties were set up to look at all the 
disputes or particular disputes brought to the GATT.28 The working parties in the GATT, by 
definition, were comprised of contracting parties, so each contracting party had to send a 
representative for the meeting. The process became slightly more formalized in the 1950’s under 
the GATT Director General Eric Wyndham-White, where panels of experts were used to decide 
disputes.29 These panels, unlike the working parties, were made up of individuals acting on their 
own accord and not as representatives of their governments (although the choice of panelists was 
usually among the national representatives to the GATT). Jackson argues that this shift signified 
an attempt by the contracting parties to make the GATT dispute settlement system a rule-
oriented system rather than one more based on power and negotiated settlement by the parties.30 
However, once a panel decided a matter the losing party could essentially veto and prevent the 
adoption of the panel decision because the report needed to be adopted through consensus. 
Despite the blocking possibilities, the early GATT adjudication system worked very well 
 
25 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed., 2000), at 114-15. 
26 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999), at 4. 
27 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed., 2000), at 115. 
28 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109-11 (2nd ed., 2000). 
29 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed., 2000), at 115-16. 
30 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed., 2000). 
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because the GATT member governments wanted it to work.31 Hudec argues that this is because 
the early GATT was made up of a small group of like-minded trade policy officials who 
themselves had written the GATT language and did not require an elaborate decision-making 
procedure to generate a consensus.32 
Despite the successes of the 1950s, the GATT dispute settlement procedures were not 
used again until the 1970s.33 During this period, there were fundamental changes in the GATT 
membership with the creation of the European Community and the inclusion of many developing 
countries: “[s]uddenly, the conventional wisdom of GATT was that lawsuits were a 
nonproductive way to approach any problem.”34 There was only a slow return to the system in 
the 1970s in the attempt to address non-tariff barriers.35 However, it was only in 1979, through 
the efforts of the U.S. that the system was truly brought back into operation, and the basic 
operating procedures were written down in the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding.36 
Despite the problems with the system in the early 1980s due to the dramatic increase in 
the GATT membership and the politicization of many politically sensitive disputes, increases in 
the Secretariat staff and growing faith in the integrity of the system promoted a very successful 
system by the end of the 1980s.37 It should be noted that this system was effective despite the 
fact that there were few concrete procedures and that the whole system was voluntary. Hudec 
argues that the procedural weaknesses had little impact on the overall success of the GATT 
because of the political will of the governments to have working legal order: 
 
31 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999), at 6. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Hudec suggests that there was over an 80% success rate in disposing of disputes. He does not give the compliance 
rate for those decisions, however. Id., at 8. 
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“Although the procedure was not compulsory, defendant 
governments almost always decided to cooperate with it. They did so 
under the pressure of strong community consensus that every GATT 
member should have a right to have its legal claims heard by an 
impartial third-party decision-maker…. Although compliance was not 
always forthcoming, the pressure to comply was almost always there 
once the community arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct. 
As for the power of the veto [and] the authorization of trade sanctions, 
that hardly mattered at all, because there were almost no requests for 
permission to employ trade sanctions. As in the 1950s, the ruling 
seemed to be enough.”38 
Thus by the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT dispute settlement system had 
become one “built solidly on the authority of legally binding obligations.”39 And, many of the 
new DSU procedures were a codification of the processes already established in the GATT.40 
After forty-seven years, the dispute settlement system was fully integrated into the text of the 
GATT 1994 treaty as a mandatory treaty obligation, not as interpretations or understandings of 
practices of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII.41 
While keeping many facets of the previous system, the DSU has brought to bear several 
fundamental institutional changes in the dispute settlement system to provide “security and 
stability to the multilateral trading system.”42 First, the new dispute mechanism, comprising 27 
sections with a total of 147 paragraphs and 4 appendices, is more detailed than the GATT 
procedures.43 Second, the WTO system remedied the fragmentation of the GATT and forum 
shopping possibilities for those contracting parties signatory to the plurilateral codes of the 
GATT.44 Marceau argues that the creation of the integrated system of dispute settlement in the 
 
38 Id., at 9-10. 
39 Id., at 10-11. 
40 Id., at 11. 
41 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM DAVEY, & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNAITONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 340 (3d. Ed. 1995). 
42 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter DSU], Article 3(2), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
43 AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 59 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, ed., 1997). 
44 Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic 
Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of the World Trade Organization in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
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WTO was one of the best success stories of the Uruguay Round negotiations.45 Third, the GATT 
Council was replaced with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is essentially the General 
Council (GC) in a different guise comprised of representatives from each Member, and has the 
responsibility of administering the dispute settlement system.46 Fourth, there has been a change 
to a negative consensus system which ensures that the losing party cannot block the formation of 
a panel.47 Fifth, an Appellate Body48 now provides for appeal from the panel decisions. Finally, 
the complaining party can seek authorization to take retaliatory action should the losing party fail 
to implement the panel recommendation within a reasonable period of time.49 
The NAFTA is a comprehensive free trade agreement created under Article XXIV50 of 
the GATT.51 The NAFTA came into being in 1994, and replaced the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997), at 
495. 
45 Id. ,at 495-96. 
46 AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 59 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, ed., 1997), at 
61. 
47 A dispute settlement panel in the WTO is a body established ad hoc to give a ruling in a trade-related dispute 
between two trading nations of the WTO. In the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, panels consist of three 
experts who examine and issue recommendations (Panel Report) on a particular dispute in the light of WTO 
provisions. The Report is then adopted by the DSB, and may be appealed to the Appellate Body. 
48 The Appellate Body (AB) is the seven-person body established by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body to hear 
and resolve appeals made by WTO Members from recommendations in dispute settlement cases made by dispute 
settlement panels. The members of the AB are appointed for four years (renewable once) and are experts in 
international trade law. 
49 AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 59 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, ed., 1997), at 
59. 
50 GATT Article XXIV reads: 
 
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the contracting 
parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article 
XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application.  Each such 
customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as 
though it were a contracting party;  Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create 
any rights or obligations as between two or more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been 
accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional 
Application by a single contracting party. 
 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to mean any territory with 
respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of 
such territory with other territories. 
 
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent: 
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(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to facilitate 
frontier traffic;   
 
(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by countries 
contiguous to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in conflict with the Treaties of 
Peace arising out of the Second World War. 
 
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, 
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such 
agreements.  They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such 
territories. 
 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting 
parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary 
for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area;  Provided that: 
 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a 
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any 
such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such 
union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence 
of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be;   
 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent 
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim 
agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such 
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other 
regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the 
free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be;  and 
 
(c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and 
schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable 
length of time. 
 
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a contracting party proposes to increase any rate of 
duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply.  In 
providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the 
reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union. 
 
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make 
such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
 
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to in 
paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the information made 
available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such 
agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period 
contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement.  The parties shall not maintain or put into 
force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations. 
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(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5 (c) shall be 
communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties concerned to consult 
with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-
trade area. 
 
8. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
 
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with 
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and, 
 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
territories not included in the union; 
 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 
 
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations with contracting parties 
affected.* This procedure of negotiations with affected contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the 
elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b). 
 
10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do not fully 
comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a 
customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article. 
 
11. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the establishment of India and Pakistan as 
independent States and recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an economic unit, the contracting parties 
agree that the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from entering into special 
arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a 
definitive basis.* 
 
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance 
of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territories. 
51 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America, the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States [hereinafter NAFTA], Article 101. The 
Agreement covers trade in goods, the phased-out elimination of tariffs within a decade-long period (mostly within 
five years, and some in fifteen years), the elimination of quotas and licensing requirements, detailed rules of origin, 
customs procedures, energy, agriculture, emergency safeguards, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS), government procurement, telecommunications, financial services, competition 
policy, intellectual property, and, as mentioned above, three side agreements on imports and “trade and” issues. 
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Agreement (CUSFTA),52 which had been formed in 1989, by expanding the scope of the 
Agreement and adding an additional member, Mexico.  
The dispute settlement procedures in the NAFTA and its predecessor CUSFTA have 
themselves had a limited caseload,53 but have benefited from the hindsight of the fifty years of 
GATT procedures. Indeed the North American regional trading system has “borrowed from 
practices developed in the GATT forum.”54 Marceau states that “[the FTA] dispute settlement 
provisions were, by and large, the same as the WTO/GATT procedures as they emerged from the 
Uruguay Round. Indeed some Uruguay Round innovations in the GATT/WTO procedures were 
first implemented in the [CUSFTA].”55 
A main difference between the WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement systems is the 
NAFTA’s definite reliance on diplomatic solutions. Despite the similarities with the WTO 
procedures which will be examined below, the NAFTA dispute settlement procedures are based 
on “cooperation and consultation”56 between the NAFTA countries, and focus on bilateral, 
 
52 The 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was the model for NAFTA. The Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) was a trade agreement reached by Canada and the United Staes in October 1987. The FTA provided for the 
gradual elimination of tariffs and reductions in non-tariff trade barriers on goods. On January 1, 1998, all tariffs on 
Canada and U.S. origin goods were eliminated, with the exception of a limited number of over-quota tariffs 
associated with tariff quotas on some agricultural products. These tariff quotas replaced earlier non-tariff measures 
and were implemented by both the U.S. and Canada in 1995 as part of the outcome of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The Agreement also incorporated more effective dispute settlement processes. The 
Agreement removed several trade restrictions in stages over a ten year period, and resulted in a great increase in 
cross-border trade. A few years later, it was superseded by the NAFTA, which included Mexico as well. It was 
fought vigorously by Canadian citizens’ groups as a massive instrument of environmental deregulation, downward 
pressure on wages and labor standards, as well as weakening of social programs. This Agreement was the first of the 
comprehensive international commercial agreements that have replaced traditional trade agreements. 
53 As of 2001, the total caseload for the NAFTA dispute settlement systems was 80 disputes. There were 76 panel 
reviews under Chapter 19 (26 active) and 4 arbitral panels under Chapter 20 (1 active). NAFTA Secretariat Status 
Report of Active and Completed NAFTA Panels, NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Section, July 17, 2001. 
54 Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic 
Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of the World Trade Organization in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997), at 
489. 
55 Id. 
56 Chapter Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures) of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Exporter’s Guides to U.S. Trade Agreements, Trade Compliance Center, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. http://www.mac.doc.gov/Tcc/e-guides/ed_naf20.html (11/14/2001).**** 
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negotiated solutions to disputes. The procedures of a dispute, contained in 19 Articles in Chapter 
20, on which this article will focus, are less complicated than those of the WTO and are, in 
theory, supposed to be quicker. While the empirical evidence does not show automatic 
compliance, it does, however, show political impetus to resolve disputes in a timeframe 
practicable to the losing party, as we will see below.  
Unlike the WTO, which has an integrated dispute settlement system, the NAFTA’s 
enforcement mechanisms are contained in five separate dispute settlement mechanisms:57 
1) the government-to-government dispute settlement system, under Chapter 20; 
 
2) the bi-national panels for adjudication of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
measures, under Chapter 19; 
 
3) various sector-specific measures [such as Chapter 11 for investment] for arbitration 
and/or dispute resolution, including more specific consultation for processes; 
 
4) the use of national adjudication systems, especially for intellectual property and 
government procurement disputes; and 
 
5) dispute resolution for the side agreements on labor and environmental issues. 
 
For adequate comparison with the parallel WTO dispute settlement measures, this article 
will focus on the sole dispute settlement mechanism within the NAFTA that consists of 
government-to-government disputes, and which pertains to the “avoidance or settlement of all 
disputes between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement. . . .”58 
The other dispute settlement mechanisms -for example, under Chapter 1959 and Chapter 11,60 
57 Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic 
Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of the World Trade Organization in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997), at 
495.  
58 NAFTA Article 2004. For the jurisdiction of the Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism, please see Annex 
2004 following in the text. 
59 Chapter 19 (Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations), Article 1904 establishes a 
mechanism to provide an alternative to judicial review by domestic courts of final determinations in antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases, with review by independent binational panels. A Panel is established when a Request 
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pertaining to anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and investment measures, respectively- 
allow the involvement of private parties from the NAFTA countries to be party to the dispute 
settlement proceedings. Therefore, the focus will be on Chapter 20 disputes.  
The Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism is similar to its predecessor, Chapter 18 
under CUSFTA, with few modifications.61 The Parties can bring a dispute under Chapter 20:62 
1. If any Party considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it 
under any provision of: (a) Part Two (Trade in Goods), except for those provisions of 
Annex 300-A (Automotive Sector) or Chapter 6 (Energy) relating to investment, (b) Part 
Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), (c) Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade in 
Services), or (d) Part Six (Intellectual Property), is being nullified or impaired as a result 
of the application of any measure that is not inconsistent with this Agreement, the party 
may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Chapter. 
 
2. A Party may not invoke: (a) paragraph 1(a) or (b), to the extent that the benefit arises 
from any cross-border trader in services provision of Part Two or Three, or (b) paragraph 
1(c) or (d) , with respect to any measure subject to an exception under Article 2101 
(General Exceptions). 
 
for Panel Review is filed with the NAFTA Secretariat by an industry asking for a review of an investigating 
authority's decision involving imports from a NAFTA country.  
In Canada, it is the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), which makes dumping and subsidy 
determinations, while the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) conducts injury inquiries as to whether or 
not the dumping or subsidy has caused injury or retardation (material retardation of the establishment of a domestic 
industry) or is threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry.  
In the United States of America, it is the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 
which makes dumping and subsidy determinations, while the United States International Trade Commission 
conducts injury inquiries.  
In Mexico, it is the Secretaría de Economía, Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales that makes 
both the dumping /subsidy and injury determinations.  
These agencies are referred to as investigating authorities. The dumping, subsidy and injury determinations 
of the investigating authorities can also be appealed, in Canada to the Federal Court of Canada, in the United States 
to the Court of International Trade and in Mexico to the Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación. 
60 Chapter 11 (Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party) establishes a mechanism 
for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors of the Parties to the 
Agreement in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal. 
A NAFTA investor who alleges that a host government has breached its investment obligations under Chapter 11 
may, at its option, have recourse to one of the following arbitral mechanisms: 
1. the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); 
2. ICSID's Additional Facility Rules; and  
3. the rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules). 
Alternatively, the investor may choose the remedies available in the host country's domestic courts. An 
important feature of the Chapter 11 arbitral provisions is the enforceability in domestic courts of final awards by 
arbitration tribunals. 
61 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT, 102 (1993). 
62 NAFTA Annex 2004. 
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Under this Chapter, disputes arising under the NAFTA and the GATT obligations or “any 
successor agreement [WTO], may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining 
party.”63 However, if the Third NAFTA Party requests it; or if the dispute involves specified 
environmental agreements; SPS measures; or environment, health, safety, or conservation 
standards, the dispute must be resolved through the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism.64 
Once a proceeding has begun under NAFTA Chapter 20 or the WTO, the “forum selected shall 
be used to the exclusion of the other”65 unless the Party can appeal to any of the exceptions 
which are NAFTA-specific.  
 
B. Institutional Scene
A comparison of the actual procedures for bringing cases before the WTO and the NAFTA 
displays the difference in complexity of the rules between the systems. In the WTO, when one 
Member believes that its rights under the WTO or other listed trade agreements have been 
breached, it “undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity 
for consultation” with the offending Member which “shall” be notified to the DSB.66 In the 
NAFTA, when a Party believes that any existing or proposed measure or any other measure 
enacted by the other Party may affect the operation of NAFTA, the complaining Party “may” 
request consultations with the other Party.67 The “may” perhaps suggests sovereignty concerns 
 
63 NAFTA Article 2005(1). 
64 NAFTA Article 2005(2)-(4); FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, 100 (1995). 
65 NAFTA Article 2005(6). 
66 The offending Member must reply within 10 days (or if mutually agreed otherwise) and consultations must be 
held within 30 days of the original request (or 10 days if the goods involved are perishable). DSU Article 4.2-4.3. 
67 NAFTA Article 2006(1). With regards to third parties during the consultations, if a WTO Member that believes it 
has a substantial trade interest as a third party, it may notify the DSB and the parties to the dispute of its desire to 
join the proceedings. DSU Article 4.11. The decision as to whether the third party has a sufficiently large trade 
interest rests upon the respondent party (for the purposes of consultations). DSU Article 4.11. Where the Third Party 
deems itself to have a substantial interest in the proceedings between the other Parties, it “shall be entitled” to be a 
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and leaves room for the parties to pursue other possible options.  
 While the NAFTA’s “may” appears weaker than the DSU language, it is in fact the 
NAFTA that places more emphasis on resolving a dispute at the consultation phase. In the DSU, 
the text states that a “mutually acceptable” solution “is clearly to be preferred.”68 Also, where the 
parties fail to reach a solution through consultations, they have an additional voluntary option to 
resolve their differences. The Director General may act in an ex officio capacity and provide 
“good offices, conciliation or mediation” which may begin at any point in the dispute.69 In 
reality, over 30% of the disputes brought to the WTO from 1995 to 2001 have been resolved 
bilaterally, and another 14% have been resolved in other ways.70 Until 2001, the “good offices” 
option had never been used, and in all of the remaining disputes either the original party had not 
received a response to the request for consultation within 10 days of the original request or the 
consultations had failed to accomplish a solution within 60 days; thus the complaining party had 
asked the DSB to establish a panel.71 
The NAFTA language is stronger. The Parties “should make every attempt” to come to a 
resolution of the matter between them in a mutually acceptable manner by a) providing sufficient 
information to each other regarding their rights which have been harmed under NAFTA, b) 
treating confidential or proprietary information with the same level of care as the other Party, and 
 
part of the consultations on delivery of written notice to the other Parties and its Section of the NAFTA secretariat. 
NAFTA Article 2006(3); Note the difference with the WTO DSU Article 4.11 where the inclusion of the third party 
Member is contingent upon the respondent party finding that the “claim of substantial interest is well-founded.” In 
the WTO, if the Party is not allowed to join the proceeding already initiated it has the ability to initiate its own case. 
DSU Article 4.11. In NAFTA, on the other hand, the Third Party has the ability to join at the Panel stage and if it 
does not do so “shall refrain” from initiating a similar dispute under NAFTA or at the WTO.  NAFTA Article 
2008(3)-(4). A Third Party under NAFTA (the sole NAFTA party not a party to the case already) can join a dispute 
if it follows the stipulated procedures, whereas in the WTO the inclusion of a third party is dependent on the assent 
of the respondent, probably for the sake of efficient administration. 
68 DSU Article 3.7. 
69 DSU Article 5.6.  This has never been used in any dispute to date. 
70 36 out of 121 disputes were resolved bilaterally (DSU Article 3.6) and 17 out of 112 were resolved through other 
means (DSU Articles 3.1, 12.12, and others). 
71 DSU Articles 4.5. If more than one Member requests the establishment of a Panel on the same matter, the same 
Panel will hear the claims of all the parties. DSU Article 9. 
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c) trying to avoid a solution that adversely affects any other Party.72 And, the equivalent of the 
DSU’s “good offices” is mandatory in the NAFTA, which requires an additional step of 
consultations with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission if initial bilateral consultations fail.73 
The NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which comprises of cabinet-level representatives of the 
Parties and oversees many aspects of the proper functioning of NAFTA, must convene within 10 
days of the delivery of the request and try to resolve the dispute.74 The Commission has the 
power to consult with experts or create working groups or expert groups to gather more 
information; to have recourse to good offices, conciliation, meditation, or such other dispute 
resolution procedures; or make recommendations whereby the parties may resolve their dispute 
in a satisfactory manner.75 It is only if the Commission is unsuccessful in resolving the dispute 
within 30 days or another period of time agreed upon by the Parties, that any of the Parties may 
request in writing the establishment of an arbitral panel which the Commission will then 
establish.76 
The differences between the WTO and the NAFTA Chapter 20 in the consultation and 
panel establishment phase should be considered. While the language of the DSU’s rules on 
consultations seems less geared to achieving a diplomatic solution, over 44% of the disputes in 
which consultations are requested never get to a Panel. While it is not possible to assess the 
success of the consultation phase of the NAFTA Chapter 20 because of the limited number of 
cases that have been decided, it could be argued that this two-step consultation phase might give 
 
72 NAFTA Article 2006(5). 
73 The disputing Parties are to request in writing a meeting with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission within 30 days 
of the initial consultation request, 45 days if there has been the inclusion of another Party, 15 days if the matter was 
regarding perishable goods, or any period of time agreed on by the Parties. NAFTA Article 2007(1). 
74 Under NAFTA Article 2001.2, the Commission is to a) supervise the implementation of [NAFTA]; (b) oversee its 
further elaboration, (c) resolves disputes that may arise regarding its interpretation or application; (d) supervise the 
work of all committees and working groups established under this Agreement, referred to in Annex 2001.2l and (e) 
consider any other matter that may affect the operation of this Agreement. 
75 NAFTA Article 2007(5). 
76 NAFTA Articles 2008(1)-(2). 
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the parties more opportunities to discuss solutions and avoid legal proceeding. If all these 
consultations fail, however, both systems have recourse to a panel. In the WTO, because of the 
negative consensus-rule, a judicial-type panel is automatically adopted within 20 days of the 
DSB’s decision to establish it.77 In the NAFTA, the Free Trade Commission, at the behest of the 
parties, establishes an “arbitral” panel.78 While a NAFTA panel functions in a similar fashion to 
one in the WTO, by calling it an arbitral panel, the NAFTA countries seem to have intended 
more of an arbitration-style approach to be taken in the proceedings. 
 The first step to forming a panel in both systems is the choosing of the panelists.  WTO 
panels are composed of three independent panelists who, among other stipulated qualifications, 
have a “sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.”79 While the WTO 
Secretariat keeps a record of potential panelists on file, the Members are free to choose panelists 
who meet the requirements within 20 days or the Director General, together with the Chairman 
of the relevant Council/Committee, will make the choice.80 In the NAFTA, five panelists are 
selected by the Parties from a roster, established by consensus among the NAFTA Parties, 
containing a list of individuals who each have three-year terms.81 When two Parties are involved, 
they need to agree on the chair of the panel within 15 days of the request to establish the panel; if 
they cannot agree, the Party chosen by lot shall within 5 days select a chair who is not a citizen 
of that Party.82 Within 15 days of the selection of the chair, each Party must select two additional 
panelists who are citizens of the other Party and, again, if there is a lack of agreement, the Parties 
use a system of lots.83 When all three NAFTA Parties are involved, the procedures for choosing 
 
77 DSU Article 7. 
78 NAFTA Article 2008. 
79 DSU Article 7. 
80 DSU Article 8.7. 
81 NAFTA Article 2009(1). 
82 NAFTA Articles 2011.1(a)-(b). 
83 NAFTA Article 2011.1(c). 
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the chair are quite similar; with the panelists, however, the party complained against has to select 
two panelists, who each must be a citizen of the complaining parties, respectively.84 The 
complaining Parties then choose two panelists from the Party against whom they are 
complaining. And, a system of lots is used if there is any dispute.85 Unlike the WTO, where most 
panelists come from a wide array of countries, the NAFTA has predominantly NAFTA citizens 
as panelists (as assumed by the detailed rules) and has thus devised a more complex system to 
ensure fairness.86 
After the panelists are chosen under the DSU rules, under the agreed upon terms of 
reference, the Panel is supposed to complete its examination and report within six months, 
consulting with both parties at least twice and seeking information from any source it deems 
appropriate, including consultation with an Expert Review Group.87 The NAFTA panel has a 
similar information gathering system. Once the panelists are chosen, the arbitral panel receives 
written and oral testimony from the Parties. In addition, on request by one of the Parties or by the 
panel’s initiative, the panel may seek information from outside experts “provided that the 
disputing Parties so agree and subject to such terms and conditions as such Parties may agree.”88 
84 NAFTA Articles 2011.2(a)-(c). 
85 NAFTA Article 2011.2(d). 
86 When a dispute arises under Chapter 19, a panel of five members is selected from the national Roster lists. Each 
government in the dispute (through its trade minister) appoints two panelists, in consultation with the other involved 
government (Chapter 19 panels are always binational in composition). The fifth panelist is from one of the two 
countries and generally alternates with each dispute.  
Under Chapter 20, an arbitral panel is established using a reverse selection process. Under this process, 
each disputing Party selects two panelists who are citizens of the other disputing Party. The chair of the panel is 
selected by the disputing Parties and may be a citizen of a NAFTA Party or any other country. 
To serve on a specific panel, roster candidates must complete Disclosure Statements pursuant to a NAFTA 
Code of Conduct. The Code is fundamental to the process. The governing principle is that a roster candidate and 
panel member must disclose any interest, relationship or matter that is likely to affect his/her independence or 
impartiality or that might create an appearance of impropriety or bias. NAFTA panelists and committee members are 
not permanent arbitrators, but are established on ad hoc basis.  
87 DSU Articles 12, 13; App. 4. The Panel has nine months at the longest to issue its report. And, it must complete 
its examination in three months if the dispute relates to perishable goods.  
88 NAFTA Article 2014; FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE 
NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
(1995), at 101. Note that the DSU Article 13 provides that “[e]ach panel shall have the right to seek information and 
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In the WTO, after the Panel has examined the written and oral evidence of the parties to 
the dispute as well as third parties that have been granted permission to make oral and written 
submissions by the DSB and all multiple complainants, it distributes the fact and argument 
sections of the report to the parties for comments, and then subsequently issues the entire interim 
report to the parties for comments once again.89 The Panel then issues a final report to the DSB, 
which then circulates the report to all of the Members and must adopt the report within 60 days 
of issuance, unless one of the parties indicates its intention to appeal or a consensus against 
adoption is reached in the DSB.90 If the Panel report is not appealed or contested, the DSB 
adopts the Panel report. If there is an appeal which either party can make, the case goes to the 
standing Appellate Body (AB), which has 7 permanent members, 3 of whom sit on each case. 
The AB makes its determinations purely on matters of law and must report its findings to the 
DSB within 60 days and no more than 90 days.91 The DSB must adopt the AB report within 30 
days contingent upon consensus in the DSB and both parties must unconditionally accept the 
recommendations of the AB or Panel (where it is not appealed).92 
In contrast, the NAFTA text sets different parameters for the panel reports, provides for 
no formal adoption proceedings, and has no provisions for appeal. Upon compiling the 
information provided by the Parties and any outside expert advice, the panel must issue an initial 
report within 90 days of the panel creation in which it must stipulate: a) findings of fact, b) 
 
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.” (Emphasis added) The Panel only needs 
to “inform the authorities of [the] Member” if it is seeking information within the Member’s boundaries. Otherwise, 
unlike under NAFTA, the Panels have a free hand to seek information from whomever the Panelists wish without 
seeking the consent of the Members. A similar consent system is used for Scientific Review Boards which the panel 
or disputing party can request. NAFTA Article 2015. 
89 DSU Articles 15, 10.2, 9.2. With regards to multiple complainants and third party complainants, they also have 
the right to receive copies made by the other parties to the dispute. And, with multiple complainants, they can 
request that the Panel present separate reports at the completion of the investigation.  
90 DSU Article 16. 
91 DSU Article 17. 
92 DSU Articles 16, 17. 
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determination on whether the measure at issue causes nullification or impairment in the sections 
subject to Chapter 20’s jurisdiction, and “c) recommendations, if any, for the resolution of the 
dispute”93 (emphasis added). The Parties have the opportunity to submit written comments 
within 14 days of the issuance of the report and the panel, having the opportunity to consider the 
views of the parties or reconsider its report, shall issue the final report within 30 days of the 
initial report, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise.94 
The Parties may not appeal the final report because Chapter 20 does not provide for 
appellate review, and the Panel does not issue a binding remedy on procedures through which to 
solve the dispute. Instead, the Parties, on the receipt of the final report, are to “agree on the 
resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and 
recommendations of the panel”95 and have to notify the secretariat of their agreed upon solution. 
The panel cannot enforce its recommendations, nor does the Secretariat oversee the 
implementation. In this respect, Abbot argues, “it is of cardinal significance to the institutional 
structure of the NAFTA that the Parties must agree in a resolution of a dispute after the panel 
renders its decision.”96 Unlike in the WTO, the Parties bear the onus of negotiating a mutually 
acceptable solution based on the panel report with minimal guidance from the institutional 
structure, perhaps once again in deference to sovereignty concerns.  
 The limited involvement of the NAFTA institutional structure in determining the nature 
of the resolution of the dispute is also reflected in the NAFTA post-adjudication proceedings. 
While the NAFTA language lacks detail, the DSU has very specific rules that the parties are 
required to follow. 
 
93 NAFTA Article 2016(2). 
94 NAFTA Articles 2016 (4)-(5); 2017(1). 
95 NAFTA Article 2018(1). 
96 FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND 
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (1995), at 101. 
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At the DSB meeting held within 30 days of the adoption of the AB/Panel report, the party 
concerned must state its intentions with regards to the implementation of the report.97 If it is 
“impracticable to comply immediately,” the Member “shall have a reasonable period of time 
[RPT] in which to do so.”98 The RPT is defined in DSU Article 21.3 as: 
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is 
approved by the DSB; or in absence of such approval, 
 
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the 
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such 
agreement, 
 
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date 
of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration, a guideline for the 
arbitrator should be that the [RPT] to implement panel or Appellate Body 
recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or 
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the 
particular circumstances. 
 
In cases where “there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered 
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings,” the complaining 
party has recourse to what is referred to as a “21.5 Panel,” whereby the proposed implementation 
is referred to the original panel for adjudication.99 And, even though the DSU is silent on 
appealing 21.5 Panel reports, the right was first identified in Brazil – Export Financing Program 
for Aircraft.100 As there is no independent policing body responsible for enforcing the panel and 
AB decisions, the DSB, composed of all the WTO Members, is the supervisory body for 
surveillance and implementation; and, the DSU provides that the “issue of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months 
 
97 DSU Article 21. 
98 Id. 
99 DSU Article  21.5. 
100 WT/DS46. 
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following the date establishment of the [RPT]… and shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until the 
issue is resolved.”101 
In cases of non-implementation, the complaining party must negotiate with the 
responding party in order to establish a “mutually acceptable” level of compensation, typically 
conceived of in terms of trade concessions.102 If no satisfactory level has been set within 20 days 
after the expiry of the RPT, the complaining party may request authorization from the DSB to 
suspend concessions103 or obligations104 to the other party under the agreement in question.105 
And, the DSB should grant this request within 30 days of the expiry of the RPT unless there is a 
lack of consensus.106 If the party causing the injury disputes the level of suspension granted by 
the DSB, it can request arbitration either to be carried out by the original Panel or by an 
arbitrator appointed by the Director General: the “Article 22.6”107 arbitration should produce a 
 
101 Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic 
Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of the World Trade Organization in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997), at 
531; DSU Article 21.6. 
102 DSU Article 22.2. 
103 WTO negotiations produce general rules that apply to all members, and specific commitments made by 
individual member governments. The specific commitments are listed in documents called “schedules of 
concessions.” The schedules reflect the “concessions” a member has given in trade negotiations. For more 
information, see World Trade Organization, “Members’ Commitments,” in 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm (last visited March 28, 2005). 
104 In the framework of trade in services, for example, obligations contained in the GATS may be categorized into 
two groups: 1) general obligations which apply directly and automatically to all Members, regardless of the 
existence of sectoral commitments; and 2) specific commitments whose scope is limited to the sectors and activities 
where a Member has decided to assume market access and national treatment obligations. Obligations can also be 
divided into unconditional and conditional obligations. Unconditional obligations apply to all services except those 
not subject to coverage by the GATS. Examples of unconditional obligations are the most-favored-nation treatment 
(except for those listed in the Annex on Article II Exemptions) and certain transparency obligations, whereas 
conditional obligations are Member-specific and contained in individual Members’ schedules of specific 
commitments. Conditional obligations are assumed in a “bottom-up” or positive list approach. 
105 DSU Article 22.2. 
106 DSU Article 22.6. 
107 DSU Article 22.6 reads: 
 
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization to suspend 
concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB 
decides by consensus to reject the request.  However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension 
proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed where a 
complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 
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final report within 60 days of the expiry of the RPT.108 The DSB shall then, on request by the 
complainant, authorize the suspension of concessions at the level determined by the arbitrator, 
unless the DSB rejects the request by consensus.109 While the DSB/arbitrator should authorize 
the suspension of concessions in the same sector as the issue in question, there are possibilities 
for cross-relation with other sectors or other covered agreements if the suspension is not 
“practicable or effective” in the same sector.110 
It must be pointed out that the DSU specifically stipulates that compensation and 
suspension of concessions must be “temporary,” and are methods not preferred to “full 
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered 
agreements.”111 Most importantly, “[c]ompensation [by the losing party] is voluntary, and, if 
granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.”112 Although the WTO does not have 
legal powers per se to enforce the rulings, the sanction possibilities seek to chastise the Members 
breaching the WTO or other covered agreements.113 The compliance power of the WTO rests on 
the moral force of its rulings, the strength of the Member adopting the retaliation, and the 
diplomatic pressure exerted by the parties to the case as well as the WTO Members 
compositely.114 Drawing from the history of the WTO dispute settlement system discussed 
above, while the political will to undertake the WTO legal obligations might be very strong for 
 
3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if 
members are available, or by an arbitrator [the expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an 
individual or a group] appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the date of 
expiry of the reasonable period of time.  Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended during the course 
of the arbitration. 
108 Id. 
109 DSU Article 22.7. 
110 DSU Article 22.3. 
111 DSU Article 22.1. 
112 Id. 
113 AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 59 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, ed., 1997), 
at 68-69. 
114 Id., at 69. 
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the losing party, whether the Member will ultimately comply with the ruling depends on its 
political will in the dispute at hand.  
The NAFTA post-arbitral proceedings reflect the bilateral, negotiation-based 
underpinnings of the Chapter 20. NAFTA Article 2018 states that the best possible resolution is 
non-implementation or removal of a measure which the panel has determined has caused 
nullification or impairment of the complaining Party’s NAFTA obligations, or “failing such a 
resolution, compensation.”115 However, if: 
“the Party complained against has not reached an agreement with any complaining Party 
on a mutually satisfactory resolution pursuant to Article 2018(1) within 30 days of
receiving the final report, such complaining party may suspend the application to the 
Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they have 
reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute.”116 (emphasis added). 
 
Unlike the WTO system of RPT for compliance, NAFTA provides 30 days for the losing 
party to implement a solution. However, 30 days is an impracticable period of time for 
implementation. The idea is to get together with the other side to work things out if the other side 
is acting in good faith. The NAFTA system shifts the burden to the losing defendant and it 
depends on that Party’s good faith. Since retaliation is not good for both countries, it does not 
make sense to retaliate if there is no implementation even if, within thirty days, the other side is 
trying to comply in good faith. 
 If the losing respondent fails to comply or make an adequate showing of good faith, the 
aggrieved Party can suspend concessions in the same sector as the trade measure at issue or “if it 
is not practicable or effective to suspend benefits in the same sector…[the Party] may suspend 
benefits in other sectors.”117 The NAFTA, like the DSU, provides for cross-sector retaliation, but 
 
115 NAFTA Article 2018. 
116 NAFTA Article 2019(1). 
117 NAFTA Article 2019(2). 
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the guidelines provided for the Parties to implement the retaliation contain little detail. And, 
finally, if any of the disputing Parties believe that the level of benefits suspended is “manifestly 
excessive,”118 the Party has the right to request the Commission to establish a panel which needs 
to present its determination within 60 days after the last panelist is selected or by which time the 
Parties stipulate. The NAFTA text provides no further guidance to the Parties, suggesting that the 
Parties may need to pursue diplomatic channels if the dispute is not resolved by that point. 
C. Diagnosis
Part I began with an examination of the evolution of the WTO dispute settlement system from 
one of the loose rules under the GATT which nevertheless functioned effectively, to a detailed 
rule-based system now present. Hudec underplays the novelty of the new system suggesting that 
the political will behind the institution, and not the rules themselves, ensures that an organization 
functions well. The NAFTA system also discussed above perhaps can be compared with the old 
negotiation-, diplomatic-based GATT system supported by the political will of the U.S., Canada, 
and Mexico to have a strong legal system in a regional context. Does the empirical evidence 
support these arguments? 
According to Hudec: 
“[I]f it is true that the key ingredient of international legal systems is the political 
will of member governments to comply with them, and if it is also true that the 
WTO legal reforms do not signal a sudden improvement in the less-than-perfect 
political will that caused the GATT legal system to suffer occasional failures, it 
follows that the new WTO legal system cannot expect to have one hundred 
percent compliance, even with its new and more rigorous procedures. To the 
contrary, it must be anticipated that there will be defeats when governments 
cannot, or will not, comply with some legal rulings – just as they did under 
GATT.”119 
118 NAFTA Article 2019(3). 
119 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999), at 14. 
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The empirical evidence seems to suggest the accuracy of Hudec’s assertion. For out of 
the 68 complaints resolved through Panel or Appellate Body reports from 1995 to 2001, roughly 
13 cases have entered DSU Articles 21120 or 22121 proceedings. Two of the most prominent of 
 
120 DSU Article 21 reads: 
 
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective 
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members. 
 
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members with 
respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement. 
 
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days [If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a 
meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose] after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, 
the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB.  If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings, the 
Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.  The reasonable period of time shall be: 
 
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is approved by 
the DSB;  or, in the absence of such approval,  
 
(b)  a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the date of 
adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement,  
 
(c)  a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of adoption 
of the recommendations and rulings [If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days 
after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Director-General 
within ten days, after consulting the parties].  In such arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator [The 
expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group] should 
be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations 
should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.  
However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances. 
 
4. Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or 
paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing its report, the period from the date of establishment of the panel by 
the DSB until the date of determination of the reasonable period of time shall not exceed 15 months unless the 
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.  Where either the panel or the Appellate Body has acted to extend the time of 
providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added to the 15-month period; provided that unless the parties 
to the dispute agree that there are exceptional circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months.  
 
5. Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken 
to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute 
settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its report 
within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it.  When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report 
within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of 
the period within which it will submit its report. 
 
6. The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.  The 
issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any Member at any time 
following their adoption.  Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations 
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or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of 
the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is 
resolved.  At least 10 days prior to each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a 
status report in writing of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings. 
 
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the DSB shall consider what 
further action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances. 
 
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action might 
be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their 
impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned. 
121 DSU Article 22 reads: 
 
1. Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in 
the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time.  However, 
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a 
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.  Compensation is voluntary and, 
if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.  
 
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into 
compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of 
time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the 
expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement 
procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.  If no satisfactory compensation has been 
agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute 
settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned 
of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements. 
 
3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the 
following principles and procedures: 
 
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or 
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body 
has found a violation or other nullification or impairment; 
 
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other 
obligations  with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other 
obligations in other sectors under the same agreement; 
 
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other 
obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are 
serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered 
agreement; 
 
(d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account: 
 
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body 
has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such 
trade to that party; 
 
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader 
economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; 
 
(e) if that party decides to request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant 
to subparagraphs (b) or (c), it shall state the reasons therefor in its request.  At the same time as the 
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request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded to the relevant Councils and also,  in 
the case of a request pursuant to subparagraph (b), the relevant sectoral bodies; 
 
(f) for purposes of this paragraph, "sector" means: 
 
(i) with respect to goods, all goods; 
 
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current "Services Sectoral 
Classification List" which identifies such sectors; [The list in document 
MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors] 
 
(iii)  with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories of 
intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, 
or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or 
Part IV of the Agreement on TRIPS; 
 
(g) for purposes of this paragraph, "agreement" means: 
 
(i)  with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, taken 
as a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements in so far as the relevant parties to 
the dispute are parties to these agreements; 
 
(ii)  with respect to services, the GATS; 
 
(iii)  with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPS. 
 
4. The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent 
to the level of the nullification or impairment. 
 
5. The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement 
prohibits such suspension. 
 
6. When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization to 
suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the 
DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.  However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of 
suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed 
where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to 
paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original 
panel, if members are available, or by an arbitrator [the expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either 
to an individual or a group] appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the date 
of expiry of the reasonable period of time.  Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended during the 
course of the arbitration. 
 
7. The arbitrator [the expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group 
or to the members of the original panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator] acting pursuant to paragraph 6 
shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the 
level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.  The arbitrator may also determine 
if the proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement.  However, if 
the matter referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not 
been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim.  In the event the arbitrator determines that those principles 
and procedures have not been followed, the complaining party shall apply them consistent with paragraph 3.  The 
parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties concerned shall not seek a second arbitration.  
The DSB shall be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant authorization to 
suspend concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator, unless 
the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. 
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such cases have been European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and 
Distribution of Bananas122 and the European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones).123 In Bananas, the U.S., Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras 
successfully challenged the EC-wide regime for bananas created in 1993. The regime 
discriminated against Latin American bananas (and, thus, U.S. companies) and instead favored 
bananas from EC domestic producers and from the ACP, given special trade preferences under 
the traditional preferential arrangement, the Lomé Convention.124 Because of the political 
sensitivity of the issue, the EC failed to comply with the WTO panel decision recommending that 
it bring its regime into compliance with WTO rules, and instead faced $191.4 million worth of 
100% ad valorem duties by the U.S. on products such as handbags and electric coffee makers. It 
was not until April 2001 that the U.S. and the EC agreed to a settlement whereby the EC would 
bring its regime into compliance by 2006. Assuming that the EC does follow through on the 
agreement, this dispute, rife with noncompliance, will have lasted over thirteen years.  
 
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such 
time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must 
implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a 
mutually satisfactory solution is reached.  In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to 
keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings, including those cases where 
compensation has been provided or concessions or other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations 
to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented. 
 
9. The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of measures 
affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member.  
When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agreement has not been observed, the responsible Member 
shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its observance.  The provisions of the 
covered agreements and this Understanding relating to compensation and suspension of concessions or other 
obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such observance. [Where the provisions of any 
covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of 
a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such covered 
agreement shall prevail] 
122 WT/DS27. 
123 WT/DS26. 
124 The Lome Convention links African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) developing countries to the EC. 
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The Hormones case, which began in 1998 and still has not been resolved,125 concerns 
public health and agriculture policy issues. The dispute, over the use of growth hormones in the 
U.S. and Canadian beef industry, has seen no efforts by the EC to open its market to U.S. and 
Canadian beef, despite a successful challenge of the EC hormone-ban at the WTO. Again, due to 
the political sensitivity of the issue in Europe, the EC has had to bear $116.8 million of U.S. 
retaliatory tariffs as its price for noncompliance.  
 Until 2001, in the North American context, there had been two cases of compliance 
difficulties. The first is Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products.126 This dispute over Canada’s system of government support for 
domestic milk production and export, and tariff rate quota regime for exports of fluid milk was 
brought jointly by New Zealand and the United States in 1999. The Panel ruled against Canada 
and determined the reasonable period of time of 15 months and 4 days by which time Canada 
needed to bring its regime into conformity. However, the U.S. and New Zealand took Canada to 
a 21.5 Panel for failing to comply with the DSB’s recommendation as well as a 21.5 Appeal 
which just issued its report in December 2001. The importance of the agricultural sector in 
Canada, in this case the dairy industry, has made adequate compliance very difficult and perhaps 
assures that the dispute will not be resolved quickly. 
 The second dispute is Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States.127 Just as in Canada - Dairy,128 the Mexico – Corn Syrup dispute 
has gone through DSB Panel proceedings, a 21.5 Panel, and finally an appeal of the 21.5 Panel 
 
125 It is interesting to note though, that although the WTO claims to be a transparent and open institution, the 
Hormones case was the first Panel dispute proceeding in the history of the WTO to be open to the general public at 
the WTO headquarters in September 2005. 
126 WT/DS113 (New Zealand) and WT/DS103 (U.S.). 
127 WT/DS132. 
128 Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS106. 
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decision.129 The dispute concerns a 1997 Mexican anti-dumping investigation of HFCS which 
led to anti-dumping duties on U.S. exports to Mexico. The U.S. successfully challenged the anti-
dumping determination in early 2000 at the WTO, but as of 2001 Mexico had not yet fully 
complied with the Panel’s recommendations. In fact, this dispute has spawned a NAFTA Chapter 
19 panel through which U.S. private industry has challenged the Mexican HFCS anti-dumping 
determinations.130 This seems also to have been a very politically sensitive issue in Mexico as 
interestingly, in two of the NAFTA Chapter 20 decisions discussed below, Mexico threatened 
retaliation of higher tariffs on HFCS.131 And, insufficient compliance in this case may be used as 
a bargaining tool by Mexico to gain market access to the U.S. market for Mexican sugar.132 
These four WTO cases (EC – Bananas III; EC – Hormones; Canada – Dairy; and Mexico 
– Corn Syrup) are just a few of the politically sensitive cases that Hudec suggests would spark 
instances of noncompliance. The U.S., EC, Canada, and Mexico seem to have very strong 
political will to comply with the legal obligations of the WTO and to pursue free trade.133 Thus, 
 
129 The initial panel proceeding, however, was never appealed to the AB. 
130 High Fructose Corn Syrup from the USA, (MEX-USA-98-1904-01). 
131 Mexico targeted the U.S. HFCS industry in its retaliation for the NAFTA Chapter 20 Broom Corn Dispute. 
Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard: Mexico Will Drop Retaliation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, December 11, 1998.
Mexico also threatened retaliation against the U.S. HFCS industry in the Mexican Trucking Dispute. Senators 
Continue to Dispute NAFTA Trucking Language in Spending Bill, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 27, 2001. 
132 Mexico, U.S. Handle HFCS Dispute, as Mexico Presses on Sugar Access, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, December 21, 
2001. 
133 This is particularly apparent with the successful launching of trade talks at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
November 2001. In 2001 in Doha (Qatar), a promise was given to developing countries, namely their inclusion in 
the world trading system, in order to achieve a higher level of justice and equity in the world. That is why the new 
round is called the "development agenda." The argument is that a more open and equitable trading system brings 
more peace to the world and, in this sense, the Doha Development Agenda should not be approached as a zero-sum 
game –as many developing countries seem to perceive it-, but as a win-win situation. Mr. Mandelson, who referred 
to a development package for least-developed countries (LDCs) as ‘indispensable,’ indicated at the Hong Kong 
WTO Ministerial Conference that the EU had committed to step up annual spending on aid for trade to EUR 2 
billion by 2010. One billion of this will come from EU Member States, which agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference to the increase (from EUR 400 million per year); the remainder will come from the European 
Commission. "Europe did not come to Hong Kong empty-handed on aid for trade," he said. 
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the politically sensitive cases appear to be those instances of “less-than-perfect” political will 
that Hudec describes.134 
There are no detailed statistics for the NAFTA Chapter 20 system as there have been only 
three completed disputes between 1994 and 2001. The first case (Canadian Agricultural 
Products)135 required no compliance measures since it was a negative ruling. In 1996, the U.S. 
unsuccessfully challenged Canada’s increase of over-quota tariff duties on certain agricultural 
products as a result of tariffication under the WTO Agriculture Agreement.  
The second case (Broomcorn)136 also arose in 1996 and was a dispute over the use of a 
global safeguard measures by the U.S. The U.S. Broomcorn Broom Industry filed a safeguard 
petition under §202 of the 1974 Trade Act as well as under the NAFTA Implementation Act. 
While the United States International Trade Commission (USITC)137 determined that both global 
and NAFTA imports were causing injury, the President decided to take action only in the global 
safeguards case and imposed a safeguard through December 1999. Although Honduras and 
Colombia were also affected by the safeguard action, Mexico imposed a 20% duty on U.S. 
exports of wine, wine coolers, brandy, Tennessee whiskey, fructose, notebooks, flat glass, and 
wooden furniture legally under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.138 Mexico also brought a 
NAFTA Chapter 20 case in 1998 claiming that the U.S. safeguard violated its NAFTA 
obligations. The Panel agreed with Mexico, but the U.S. did not lift the safeguard immediately. 
 
134 Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999), at 14. 
135 Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products (CDA-95-2008-01); Panel decision, 
December 2, 1996. 
136 U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Mexico (USA-97-2008-01); Panel decision, January 
30, 1998. 
137 The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is an independent, non-partisan, quasi-judicial, 
federal agency of the United States that provides trade expertise to both the legislative and executive branches. 
Further, the agency determines the impact of imports on U.S. industries, and directs actions against certain unfair 
trade practices, such as dumping (pricing policy), patent, trademark, and copyright infringement. 
138 WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 8. 
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Instead, after the ruling, the USTR requested a study from the USITC to determine whether the 
U.S. broomcorn industry had been positively affected after the safeguard had been imposed. 
Mexico, however, “[did] not [say] it would retaliate”139 in response to the study. It is probably 
because the U.S. was making a good faith attempt to comply with the ruling, a very important 
facet to the compliance phase of the NAFTA system. Six months later in December 1998, the 
USITC study determined that the U.S. broomcorn broom industry was not making the necessary 
adjustment while the tariffs were in place. This led to the decision by the Clinton Administration 
to remove the safeguard early.140 The U.S. Broomcorn Broom industry, however, blamed the 
lifting of the safeguard “on political pressure … from the much larger companies that were 
subject to the [initial] retaliation.”141 Whatever the grounding of the political will, it was 
sufficient to make the U.S. comply with the NAFTA panel report nine months after it was issued. 
 The third, more recent dispute (Trucking)142 concerned U.S. laws restricting Mexican 
firms from providing trucking services in the U.S. or even investing in the U.S. trucking 
industry. Under Annex 1 of the NAFTA, the U.S. had to phase out the reservation it had taken 
for cross-border trucking services by December 1995, but the Clinton Administration failed to 
fulfill the NAFTA obligations citing security concerns. Mexico successfully challenged the U.S. 
moratorium through a Chapter 20 Panel which found the U.S. in violation of its NAFTA 
obligations. As soon as the report was issued, the Bush Administration was much more willing to 
come to a resolution of the dispute than the Clinton Administration had been.143 Thus, Mexican 
trade officials indicated that “Mexico would not seek to retaliate right away if the U.S. did not 
 
139 Barshefsky Sidesteps Direct Response to NAFTA Panel on Mexican Brooms, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 15, 
1998. 
140 Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, December 11, 1998. 
141 Id. 
142 Cross-Border Trucking Services and Investment (USA-98-2008-01). Panel decision, February 6, 2001. 
143 Bush Administration Begins Discussion on Implementing Truck Panel, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, February 16, 2001.
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bring itself into full compliance with the panel finding after 30 days, as would be [Mexico’s] 
right under NAFTA dispute settlement procedures.”144 “Here we are looking at a U.S. 
Administration,” said a Mexican trade official, “that has said it would fulfill its NAFTA 
obligations. Our expectation is that they will comply and we expect to be satisfied.”145 The Bush 
Administration put forward its proposal to allow limited entry to Mexican trucking firms into the 
U.S. by early 2002, beginning with expanded access in border “commercial zones.”146 The 
Administration, however, faced steep opposition to the plan in Congress through the summer 
2001. It was not until November 28, 2001 that Congress and the President were able to come to a 
mutually acceptable agreement on the matter. While it is unclear whether the borders were 
opened as of January 1, 2002, the legislation has set a definitive timetable within which the U.S. 
will be in compliance with its NAFTA obligations.147 
There are a few interesting facets to this dispute. First, despite the nine month delay in 
action, the Mexican government never imposed retaliatory measures on the U.S. As in the 
Broomcorn dispute, the Administration’s good faith efforts were sufficient to assuage Mexico’s 
concerns and prevent retaliation. Second, the U.S. passed legislation to comply despite the many 
security concerns surrounding the entry of Mexican trucks into the U.S. This was a very high 
political hurdle for the Administration and Congress, particularly in light of security concerns in 
the aftermath of the September 11 tragedies. Third, James Hoffa of the Teamsters was a very 
vocal opponent of U.S. compliance with the NAFTA panel. He published a report in which he 
“argued that even if [the U.S.’] actions as a result of legislation were found to violate the 
NAFTA, the cost to the U.S. would be small. Possible retaliation from Mexico would be limited 
 
144 U.S. Faces Constraints in Implementing NAFTA Truck Panel, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, February 9, 2001. 
145 Id. 
146 Plan would open Territory to Mexican Trucks Starting in 2002, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, March 30, 2001. 
147 Congress Strikes Deal on NAFTA Trucks Supported by White House, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, November 30, 
2001. 
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to the amount of lost business due to the obstruction [i.e., less border traffic flow because of 
security concerns], which is already limited due to border congestion.”148 Mr. Hoffa actually 
quantified U.S. noncompliance at $225 million.149 If the costs of noncompliance were really that 
low, the outcome of this case perhaps shows the strong political will in the U.S. to resolve this 
dispute. 
 Overall, it seems that compliance with Chapter 20 Panel reports has been good, but 
extended. Hudec’s proposition seems to apply here as well – the NAFTA has a limited system of 
rules, yet there has been compliance in politically sensitive issues. In examining both the WTO 
and the NAFTA cases, institutions, and background, it has become all the more apparent that the 
rules of the systems are made effective by their political underpinnings. 
 
II. Comparison 
 
Because of the political nature of WTO and NAFTA disputes, the rules yield benefits and 
drawbacks for parties involved in each system. This section will look at some factors that 
determine the effectiveness of the system by examining each of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages from the perspective of the winning and losing parties.  
 
A. WTO
1. Advantages  
 
a. Losing Respondent 
 
While the losing party is constrained by the detailed series of rules under the DSU, one 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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advantage of the system is that it has a variety of ways to prolong noncompliance. After the nine 
months it customarily takes for the adoption of the first Panel report, the party can first appeal 
the decision, adding an extra three months to the process. Second, following the appeal, if the 
party loses once again and must implement the AB decision, it can try to prolong the RPT by 
proposing or negotiating a period of time with the other Member or going to arbitration to seek 
15 months (a guideline for the maximum period of time) for implementation.150 Third, the party 
need not de jure comply and instead send de facto implementation procedures to the DSB, which 
is supposed to supervise implementation. Fourth, the losing party could face a 21.5 panel for 
insufficient implementation and, fifth, if ruled against, it can try to appeal the 21.5 ruling to the 
AB.151 Sixth, after the 21.5 rulings, the party can still postpone implementation and face the DSU 
Article 22 compensation proceedings. Seventh, the party can disagree with the other Member’s 
level of compensation and can request arbitration under Article 22.6, which adds an additional 
period of time after the expiry of the RPT. It is only then that the winning party may suspend 
concessions and pursue retaliation. Since compensation appears not to be retroactive under the 
DSU and is only prospective, a losing party has all the possibilities under this system to prolong 
non-compliance.  
 This sequence of events was the case in Bananas, discussed above, which began under 
the GATT dispute settlement system in 1993. The WTO panel, which issued its report in May 
1997, ruled that the EC’s banana regime violated WTO rules on sixteen counts.152 The EC 
appealed all parts of the panel decision in July 1997; the complainants cross-appealed on three 
points.153 On September 9, 1997, the Appellate Body issued its report upholding all parts of the 
 
150 DSU Article 21.3(c). 
151 As discussed in the text supra, appealing 21.5 Panel decisions is a subject on which the WTO treaty is silent. 
Because the treaty has not explicitly prohibited the appeal, the treaty has been interpreted to allow appeals of 21.5 
panel proceedings to the original Panelists of the AB who heard the case on appeal. The first case of this was in the 
Panel on Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (WT/DS46). 
152 WTO Panel, “European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,” WTO 
Report of the Panel, Complaint by the United States, 22 May 1997, 393-397. 
153 Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, “European Communities - Regime for the 
Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,” Appeal of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United 
States under Rule 23 (1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 26 June 1997, 2-3. 
Leal-Arcas, Rafael  NAFTA-WTO 
 42
initial ruling and also reversing two of the cross-appealed opinions in favor of the 
complainants.154 
The WTO DSB adopted the reports on September 27, 1997 recommending that the EC 
bring its regime into compliance with the WTO. On October 16, 1997, the EC stated that it 
would “fully respect its international obligations with regard to this matter” and would require a 
“reasonable period of time to do so.”155 On December 17, 1997, the WTO Arbitrator, at a 
hearing requested by the complainants, granted the EC a “reasonable period of time”156 under 
Article 21.3 of the DSU, until January 1, 1999, to comply with the WTO ruling.   
The EC made some attempts to comply in 1998, but the proposals were WTO
inconsistent; the EC did not change its regime by the January 1, 1999 deadline. The U.S.
informed the DSB on January 14 that it intended to suspend concessions to the EC on trade
worth $520 million in harm to U.S. commerce.157 The EC objected to the level of tariffs that the
U.S. had requested, and exercised its right under Article 22.3 of the DSU. On 6 April, the DSU
ruled that the U.S. could suspend concessions for the amount of $191.4 million in lost U.S.
exports of goods and services. The DSB formally authorized the U.S. to begin its retaliation on
April 19, 1999.158 The U.S. instated 100% ad valorem duties on handbags, types of paper,
lithographs, paperboard, bed linen, lead-acid storage batteries, domestic electric coffee makers
(except those from Italy), and bath products from all EU countries except the Netherlands and
Denmark. The tariffs remained until July 2001 when the then U.S. Trade Representative,
Ambassador Robert Zoellick and the former EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy negotiated a
bilateral resolution. The EC has not yet brought its banana regime into conformity, despite all
these proceedings, but it has plans to implement some changes by 2006.
A second advantage to a losing respondent in the WTO system relates to retaliatory 
 
154 USTR, Notice of Determinations, Termination, and Monitoring, “Determination Under 304 of Trade Act of 
1974: European Communities’ Banana Regime,” Federal Register 63, No. 32 (18 February 1998): 8248. 
155 Id. 
156 DSU Article 21.3. 
157 USTR, “United States to Apply Its WTO Retaliatory Rights in Banana Case,” USTR Press Release, January 14, 
1999. 
158 USTR, “WTO Authorizes U.S. Retaliation,” USTR Press Release, April 19, 1999. 
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measures by the aggrieved party. There may be cases in which the dollar amount of the 
retaliation authorized by the DSB might be relatively small or the non-complying party can 
provide assistance to domestic interests hurt by the ruling. Where the quantified costs of 
noncompliance are small while the compliance measures that need to be enacted in order to be in 
compliance are politically costly, there may be no compliance at all.159 An example of this 
scenario is the Hormones case discussed above. While the European beef ban might be pure
protectionism at its roots, even American government and U.S. beef industry officials understand
that consumer concerns is very real given the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)160 –or
mad cow disease- and Belgian dioxin scares in the past few years. Because of the BSE crisis,
beef consumption in Europe was overall down by 40% around 2000-2001 which put strong
pressure on the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy and reduced the likelihood that the ban would
be lifted. Thus, as the EC has not found the sufficient domestic impetus to comply with the WTO
ruling, it has chosen to bear the retaliatory tariffs imposed by the U.S. with authorization of the
DSB.
Third, conversely, it might also be in a losing party’s interest to comply with panel and 
AB reports to strengthen the credibility of the institution and set, to some degree, some kind of 
international precedent for its own future dealings. For example, in the U.S. – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,161 which the U.S. lost, the U.S. may have wanted to 
comply with the AB reports in order to set an example for cases in which it was the winning 
party and had to enforce the case against another Member. Canada may want to set a similar 
precedent by complying with the Canada – Term of Patent Protection case.162 In this case 
 
159 See supra text in which Mr. Hoffa of the Teamsters unsuccessfully made this argument for noncompliance in the 
Mexican Trucking case under NAFTA. 
160 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease, is a fatal, neurodegenerative 
disease of cattle, which infects by a mechanism that surprised biologists on its discovery in the late XX century. 
While never having killed cattle on a scale comparable to other dreaded livestock diseases, such as foot and mouth 
and rinderpest, BSE has attracted wide attention because it seems that people can contract the disease; it is thought 
to be the cause of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), sometimes called new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(nvCJD), a human brain-wasting disease. 
161 WT/DS58. 
162 WT/DS170. 
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brought by the U.S., the AB found Canada’s Patent Act was in violation of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)163 because there were some cases in 
which Canada only provided seventeen years of protection for patents whereas the TRIPS 
Agreement stipulates a twenty-year minimum. Canada’s prompt compliance with this ruling 
should set a strong precedent for the developing world to comply with the TRIPS Agreement and 
the reports of future panels established concerning the TRIPS issues. This argument of ‘example’ 
can hold good for countries with large or small amounts of bargaining power.  
 
b. Winning Complainant  
 
While there are certainly problems with achieving compliance among Members in difficult 
cases, the WTO provides a detailed, systematic framework whereby the winning party’s position 
vis-à-vis the losing party is bolstered by the credibility of the WTO, a respected international 
institution to which Members have submitted themselves to jurisdiction. By having the DSB 
administer the compliance and having the force of the organization behind the winning party 
through an adopted Panel or AB report, the winning Member can take the diplomatic high 
ground in demanding compliance with the ruling. 
 This diplomatic pressure, combined with a rule-based approach, gives opportunities for 
the winning party to receive some sort of compensation. This system gives legitimacy to winning 
parties to demand compliance within the time-frame stipulated by the rulings as well as to 
 
163 The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Measures (TRIPS) is a Uruguay Round Agreement that 
extends WTO disciplines into the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, and trade secrets. Unlike most WTO rules, the TRIPS Agreement requires both domestic enforcement and 
border measures as part of a member’s compliance to prevent piracy and other violations. Developing countries 
were given longer transition periods for the phase-in of the TRIPS Agreement requirements. The WTO (but also the 
North American Free Trade Agreement –NAFTA- and the Free Trade Area of the Americas –FTAA-) includes new 
intellectual property rules which require signatory countries to establish specific patent, copyright and trademark 
protections in their domestic laws. The pharmaceutical industry exercised heavy influence on WTO negotiations, 
and these agreements require countries to adopt U.S.-style intellectual property laws, such as granting monopoly 
sales rights to individual patent holders for extended time periods and including seeds, medicines and other 
traditionally excluded items as those for which countries must provide patent protections. The TRIPS rules have 
been subject of a major international fight regarding poor countries’ rights to issue compulsory licenses for essential 
medicines. 
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suspend concessions and retaliate against the party in noncompliance with the authorization of 
the DSB. Although the dollar amounts of the retaliation may be, in some cases, relatively small 
amounts like in the Bananas and Hormones, diplomatically any amount of retaliation has an 
important political effect with minimal trade effects. It should be remembered that while the 
political tensions remained high over the banana and beef disputes, the retaliation amounts were, 
respectively, less than U.S.-EC trade in a morning of most business days. And, in cases where 
the amounts of potential retaliation are significant, as in the U.S. – FSC case,164 where there is 
potential for $4 billion retaliation by the EC against the U.S., the rule-oriented approach ensures 
that the aggrieved party eventually has recourse to retaliation even if there is no mutually agreed 
upon diplomatic solution.  
 The winning party has means of receiving its compensation through retaliation. If the 
non-compliant party’s same sector is not practicable or effective to provide the adequate 
compensation to the winning party, DSU Article 22.3 permits the use of cross sector retaliation. 
Or, in cases where this is not practicable or effective as well, DSU Article 22.3 provides for 
“suspension of concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement.” This is yet 
more insurance for the complaining party that it will receive some type of relief when it 
successfully challenges trade practices which are deemed WTO-incompatible. 
 The rule-oriented system is also a power-equalizing force within the organization and 
helps Members who have a relatively weaker position within the international system to have the 
possibility to achieve compliance from Members that have much more clout. The winning party, 
especially if it is a developing country, can be less concerned about its relative power in the 
international system when requesting that the noncompliant party come into compliance. For 
example, in Shrimp-Turtle,165 where the United States faced complaints from developing 
countries, it complied with the AB requests to bring the measures into compliance. Under GATT 
panel’s consensus rules, perhaps the U.S. would have been able to block the adoption of the 
 
164 United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporation,” WT/DS108. 
165 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58. 
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report, but under the WTO automaticity rules, winning parties are able to have the DSB adopt the 
reports and enforce the implementation measures.  
 Lastly, while a losing party may be able to set precedent by complying, the winning party 
may be able to establish precedent for the interpretation of a treaty provision or be able to attack 
a widely used foreign practice against it by finding one country’s provisions WTO incompatible. 
The Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals case166 serves as an appropriate 
example. In the case, the U.S. challenged Canadian domestic measures related to the sale of 
imported periodicals, which the AB found to be discriminatory. Daniel Crosbie, a Canadian trade 
official, suggested that the U.S. take the case to the WTO with view to cultural trade issues 
affecting a wider audience than just Canada. This provided the U.S. with a tactical way to set 
precedent in order to enhance world-wide market access for its magazine industry. Also, the 
Canada - Patent Term case167 may be another example of the U.S. trying to set precedent in the 
area of intellectual property. Thus, winning a case at the WTO might provide two benefits: both 
being able to change the specific WTO-incompatible measures at hand, and setting an 
international precedent.  
 
2. Disadvantages
a. Losing Respondent 
 
While the WTO system allows the prolongation of a dispute for years, in the end, the Member in 
noncompliance must either bring its measures into compliance with its obligations under the 
WTO or be faced with suspension of concessions and retaliation by the complaining party. In the 
final stages of the proceedings, the Member must decide to either garner enough political will 
domestically to comply with the rulings, bear the cost of compensating the other side for its 
measures, or weather the retaliation against its measures.  
 
166 WT/DS31. 
167 Canada – Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170. 
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Having subjected itself to WTO jurisdiction by being a member of the organization, the 
Member has little choice in determining its courses of action under the circumstances without 
undermining the organization or its position within the organization. Although the WTO lacks a 
formal enforcement mechanism, the losing country is faced with the international pressure 
against it because the Panel or AB report has been adopted by the DSB through consensus. The 
potential spillover effects of noncompliance in other diplomatic arenas are very real, as with the 
deterioration of U.S.-EC relations over the Bananas and Hormones cases. Furthermore, within 
the WTO, as stated above, the disadvantage to a losing party for noncompliance might affect its 
own ability to bring credible cases in front of the WTO dispute settlement system. If it is not 
willing to conform to rulings against its practices, why should any country against which the 
noncompliant party has complaints change its own measures? In other words, by obstinately 
refusing to comply, the noncompliant Member might give other Members the justification to 
forgo the unconditional reciprocity of WTO principles and undermine the WTO as a whole. 
 Another disadvantage for the losing party under the WTO system, as in Hormones and 
Bananas, is that the suspension of concessions/retaliation taken has not been limited to the 
sectors at issue in the dispute. Because DSU Article 22.3 provides for the possibility of cross-
sectoral retaliation, while a losing party may be noncompliant in deference to specific domestic 
interests that are affected by the subject of the dispute, the suspension of concessions by the 
complainant may rouse constituencies not party to the dispute and who are unwilling to bear the 
burden of the costs for the dispute. In weighing the injury to other sectors with cross-retaliation, 
Members might find their interests better served if they comply. 
 
b. Winning Complainant  
 
The winning Member may have been able to get a favorable ruling from a Panel or the AB, but 
where the losing party is noncompliant, there may be a sense that the complainant has followed 
all the procedural rules but has failed to reach an acceptable solution to the problem at hand. As 
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long as the noncompliant party stalls compliance, the complaining party cannot receive any relief 
as compensation in international law, unlike in domestic law, is not retroactive.168 While the 
complainant can go through a DSU Article 21.5 panel, Article 22 arbitration, and retaliation, the 
process is expensive, especially for developing countries, to risk unacceptable results, politically 
and economically. Moreover, while retaliation is a punitive measure meant to hurt the party 
causing the injury economically, measures such as ad valorem tariffs169 or import bans also hurt 
domestic producers and consumers. For example, with the 100% ad valorem duties that the U.S. 
placed on some European goods in conjunction with the banana and beef hormone disputes, 
doubling of the price of such goods as Italian coffee makers, truffles, Rocquefort Cheese, and 
handbags, may have hurt European producers, but also made the prices of these goods 
prohibitively expensive for U.S. businesses and consumers. The retaliatory measures, which are 
designed to hurt the economy of the party causing the injury, actually end up hurting the 
complaining party’s economy, in addition to the effects of the unfair trade practice of the 
noncompliant Member. 
 
B. NAFTA Chapter 20 
1. Advantages 
 
a. Losing Respondent 
 
While the losing party is bound by the decision of the NAFTA arbitral panel with regard to 
nullification and impairment, it is not bound by a recommendation to bring its measures into 
 
168 Compensation in the WTO is usually prospective. 
169 A tariff is a tax on imported goods. It is levied at the point of entry and paid to the government of the importing 
country. In other words, a tariff is a customs duty on merchandise imports. Tariffs are levied either on an ad valorem 
basis (percentage of value) or on a specific basis (e.g., $7 per 100 kg). Tariffs give price advantage to locally 
produced goods and raise revenues for the government. Tariffs are allowed to protect domestic industries. However, 
they are reduced through negotiations between countries in the WTO and then they are “consolidated.” This means 
that they cannot be increased again unless the principally affected exporting countries, which negotiated the 
concession, are compensated by concessions on other products (GATT Article XXVIII). Tariffs have been reduced 
in the previous eight trade Rounds, as a result of which the EU average industrial tariff is now about 3%, down from 
35% in 1947. 
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conformity. The NAFTA Article 2018 text states that “the disputing Parties shall agree on the 
resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and 
recommendations of the panel….” (emphasis added). The language suggests that the ultimate 
burden for the nature of the resolution falls on the parties to negotiate and that the panel report is 
more like a guideline. As discussed above, the showing of good faith in terms of implementation 
is the basis on which to avoid suspension of benefits even when implementation has not actually 
occurred. A good example of this is the Mexican Trucking case, in which the U.S. has taken nine 
months to complete its rule-making processes to proceed towards implementation. Even though 
the U.S. has not fully complied as of January 2002, Mexico has refrained from retaliating 
because of the Bush Administration’s showing of good faith attempts to comply.  
 Second, apart from the good faith requirement, the ambiguous nature of the 30 days could 
also be advantageous to the losing party. While attempting to show that it is trying to make 
progress in implementation, the Party can in effect take as long as it wants to comply. The party 
is not constrained by a WTO-like RPT nor does it have to face implementation surveillance by 
the DSB or 21.5 panels. The solution reached and implemented is wholly diplomatic once the 
panel issues its ruling. Again, in the Mexican Trucking case, Mexico has allowed the U.S. to take 
the time necessary beyond the 30 days to bring its measures into compliance. Mexico also did 
not retaliate in the Broomcorn case even though it took the U.S. nine months to remove its 
safeguard measure. Generally, the 30 day requirement de facto provides much flexibility. 
 Third, under NAFTA, any retaliation or suspension of concessions taken by the aggrieved 
party is capped by WTO obligations. This means that the complaining Party may not transgress 
its WTO tariff bindings or other obligations to gain compensation for a ruling under a NAFTA 
panel. Thus, the punitive capacity of the NAFTA Chapter 20 retaliation is limited and the 
violating party is less likely to face exorbitant damage sums.170 
170 On this point, see Kwak, K. & Marceau, G. “Overlap and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements,” The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XLI, 2003, pp. 
83-152. 
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b. Winning Complainant 
 
Although the rules may be much less detailed, the NAFTA winning party may be able to use 
diplomatic channels to come to a quicker solution than if the procedures were more 
comprehensive. First, following a consultation period which requires more disclosure of 
information than the WTO obligations to consult, the parties may be able to come to a solution 
on the basis of that openness. Second, there is a mandatory involvement by the Free Trade 
Commission under the NAFTA while under the DSU, the involvement of the Director General to 
offer good offices, conciliation, and mediation is invoked on a purely voluntary basis by the 
Parties to the dispute. This second stage of mediation-like involvement by the Free Trade 
Commission -which can be likened to the DSB in that both have national representatives as 
members-, may provide for yet another possibility of resolution. Third, if a panel is required and 
finds for the complaining party, there are no further delays with appeal procedures as with the 
AB. Finally, the 30 day period to resolve the situation or take good faith steps to set up a 
schedule for resolution might provide a better chance for immediate relief if the losing party 
complies right away. 
 If there is noncompliance and since compliance is based on more diplomatic solutions, 
the close ties among Canada, Mexico, and the United States as North Americans might serve as a 
catalyst for quicker, less delayed compliance. It might be more difficult for bordering countries 
to play noncompliance games with each other within a regional forum (such as the NAFTA) than 
it would be for them to do so through the WTO, which sits in Geneva. So, perhaps, there will be 
more political will to resolve disputes in accordance with the panel decision to lend credibility to 
the North American regional trade agreement (RTA) dispute settlement decision, and the 
winning party may have the moral impetus on its side to promote compliance. 
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2. Disadvantage
a. Losing Respondent 
 
Once a party loses under the NAFTA system, it cannot appeal the decision. So, its only recourse 
is to exploit the diplomatic channels to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution with the 
complainant. This is particularly problematic in situations where the panel could produce a report 
that has a lack of specific recommendations which the losing party can use to bring its measures 
into compliance. While it has not happened to date, perhaps such a ruling would be particularly 
troublesome for Mexico, as the country’s developing country status may limit its technical 
capabilities for compliance. 
 With the force of the panel ruling and the North American ties-type of diplomatic thrust, 
compliance might be an uphill climb for a losing party to be able to negotiate a solution too 
extenuated from the panel findings. And, the immediate threat of the 30-day time limit can make 
it harder for the losing party not to comply or at least offer a showing of good faith, provided it 
has the capabilities. Despite the fact that the NAFTA structure is disposed to promote 
negotiations and to prevent retaliation, the noncompliant party can never be sure whether or 
when the aggrieved party will decide to suspend concessions and impose retaliation.  
 In addition, the NAFTA might indeed promote faster compliance on the part of the losing 
party, while in WTO compliance cases like Hormones the losing party can take measures to stall 
compliance. If the Mexican Trucking case had been decided through the WTO dispute settlement 
process, the U.S. could have done a Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) meaning that it could have 
appealed the case to put off compliance, as has happened with US - FSC at the WTO. The 
NAFTA may have a better chance to get compliance in a difficult case such as Trucking which 
had produced a diplomatic flurry and Presidential and Congressional dialogue on the matter. As 
the developments in the case show, the U.S. did not do an FSC and instead the Bush 
Administration has aggressively pursued compliance with the NAFTA panel decision. 
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b. Winning Complainant  
 
Because of the less detailed rules under NAFTA, winning parties might face a more difficult 
time to bring a dispute to resolution than they would under a more rule-based approach in the 
WTO. While diplomatic force may, on the one hand, promote faster compliance by the other 
side, lack of diplomatic pressure can have the opposite effect. Since the NAFTA system is based 
on diplomacy, changes in diplomatic climate can have a considerable impact on the workability 
of the system. On the other hand, operations at the WTO continue regardless of diplomatic 
climate, and the established procedures provide predictability; ultimate compliance, however, 
might face the same difficulties of the NAFTA system. 
 Lastly, the lack of specific recommendations by a panel can also be a detriment to 
winning parties. While the winning party may enjoy the moral high ground and diplomatic 
backing, without binding recommendations or monitoring by a DSB-like body, compliance may 
not happen and the winning party may not know how to advise implementation of the ruling in 
the other Party’s domestic system. 
 
Epilogue and Recommendations 
 
This article has examined both the dispute settlement systems in the WTO and the NAFTA, and 
has looked at benefits and disadvantages to parties in each system. If there were to be a case 
which could be brought under either system, which should a party choose? To answer this 
question, let us look at two cases which may have been brought in either forum.171 In fact, in the 
 
171 The WTO Canada-Patent case and the NAFTA Mexican Broomcorn case are two disputes that may have been 
taken to either forum. The Canada – Periodicals case had to be brought at the WTO since the Canadian measures 
fell under the NAFTA Article 2106 and Annex 2106 Cultural exceptions. The Canada - Dairy case involved a third 
party, New Zealand, which left no option of the NAFTA forum. The Mexico – Corn Syrup case concerned dumping 
which is not covered under Chapter 20. The United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies 
(WT/DS194) concerned interpretations of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; 
subsidies also do not fall within the jurisdiction of Chapter 20.  On the NAFTA cases, the Canadian Agricultural 
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Mexican Broomcorn case where a U.S. global safeguard measure was at issue, the U.S. actually 
argued in proceedings that the NAFTA panel had no jurisdiction in this matter since the matter 
arose under the GATT Article XIX172 and the WTO Safeguards Agreement.173 The panel, 
however, determined that “[s]ince the NAFTA and WTO versions of the rule are substantively 
identical, application of the WTO version of the rule would have in no way changed the legal 
 
Products case concerned Canada’s NAFTA tariff schedule. And, the Mexican Trucking case also arises out of 
Annex 1 of the NAFTA.  
172 GATT Article XIX reads: 
 
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a 
contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory 
of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury 
to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in 
respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to 
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. 
 
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being imported 
into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to 
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a 
contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that 
other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify 
the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
such injury. 
 
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it 
shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall 
afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the 
product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action.  When such notice is given in 
relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested 
the action.  In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action 
under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that 
consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. 
 
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not reached, the 
contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such 
action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such 
action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such 
suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party 
taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party 
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the 
suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove. 
 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is taken under 
paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a 
contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where 
delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the 
period of consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. 
173 Broom Corn ¶49-50. 
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conclusion reached”174 under the corresponding NAFTA provision. Mexico probably chose the 
NAFTA forum because it has preferential tariff rates for broomcorn broom exports into the U.S. 
under the NAFTA, and determined that the safeguard measure affected its rights under the 
NAFTA tariff schedules. The other case which may have been brought in either forum seems to 
be the WTO Canada – Patent Term case. While American and Canadian trade officials suggest 
that the case arose under TRIPS obligations, identical language of the twenty-year patent 
protection exists in the NAFTA.175 Thus, this case could, in theory, have also been brought in a 
NAFTA Chapter 20 proceeding. The U.S. probably chose the WTO forum for the case’s 
precedential value, just as in Canada - Periodicals.176 
For future cases in which forum shopping might occur, the Party concerned would need 
to look at the factors compositely on a case-specific basis to determine whether a dispute should 
be brought under the WTO or the NAFTA. Furthermore, it is important to remember that all the 
NAFTA countries believe in the rule of law. Whether in the NAFTA or in the WTO, if the issue 
is difficult, the forum does not matter. This case-by-case approach suggests the highly political 
nature of forum shopping in the international trade context. For, regardless of the forum chosen, 
the dispute between the countries will only occur if diplomatic channels have been exhausted. It 
follows that if the parties are more concerned with rules and procedures, the officials might 
prefer to choose the WTO in all cases because of its highly developed dispute settlement system. 
However, if a more diplomatically based solution is on the horizon, apart from the initial 
diplomatic attempts, the NAFTA forum might be more effective. With this backdrop, this section 
will propose general criteria on which the NAFTA countries can make an informed decision 
under which system to bring the case at hand. 
 Three questions can be proposed to guide the inquiry. First, is there a substantive 
obligation that provides a cause of action at both the WTO and the NAFTA dispute settlement 
 
174 Id. at ¶50. 
175 The TRIPS Articles 70.1 and 70.2, at issue in the case, and NAFTA Articles 1720.1 and 1720.2 are virtually 
identical. Also, TRIPS Article 33 is identical to NAFTA Article 1709.12.  
176 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31. 
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systems? Second, if so, is the issue of interest to a NAFTA trading partner (under matters 
referred to Article 2005[2]177) or a Third Party at the WTO? Third, politically, may there be an 
interest in adjudicating in a broader forum rather than in a smaller forum? While the first two 
questions are concrete ‘yes/no’ type of questions, the following criteria speak to this third 
question. 
 First, the forum chosen lies with the preferences of the domestic interests who petitioned 
the action from their government. Because the WTO is a relatively new process, there is more 
awareness of the institution. And, the WTO experience has improved its credibility with 
domestic groups, and thus they think that their interests are better served at the WTO. There 
could be other disputes or other issue-specific cases where the private parties think their interests 
might be better served under NAFTA. This could include matters that are specific to North 
America. Also, for those who view the WTO as a non-transparent agency controlled by the 
secretariat staff that has its own agenda,178 the NAFTA might provide a more transparent, 
diplomatically oriented alternative to faceless bureaucrats in Geneva deciding the fate of 
domestic industries.  
 Second, the parties need to consider which forum has a more developed set of rules for 
the subject of the case at issue. If, for example, a case arose about agriculture or 
telecommunications issues in which there happened to be WTO and NAFTA concurrent 
 
177 NAFTA Article 2005 (2) reads: 
 
Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATT against another Party on grounds that are 
substantially equivalent to those available to that Party under this Agreement, that Party shall notify any third Party 
of its intention. If a third Party wishes to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement 
regarding the matter, it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and those Parties shall consult with a view to 
agreement on a single forum. If those Parties cannot agree, the dispute normally shall be settled under this 
Agreement. 
178 More transparency and information into the WTO system is being requested lately. See Hoekman, B.M. & 
Kostecki, M.M.  The Political Economy of the WTO, 2nd edn., 2001, pp. 371-72. The WTO should establish rules to 
publish Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as official documents. In this respect, although for the first time in 
the history of the WTO, a Panel dispute proceeding was open to the general public at the WTO in September 2005, 
never has an Appellate Body dispute proceeding been open to the public. This proves the lack of trust of the public 
opinion in relation to the WTO’s transparency. There should also be public access to dispute settlement proceedings. 
There should be, too, appropriate rules allowing the submission and consideration of amicus briefs. See Barfield, 
C.E. Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy, the Future of the World Trade Organization, 2001, pp. 15-16. 
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jurisdiction, the parties would need to examine the treaty provisions as well as the previous case-
law in both fora to determine which forum would be better equipped to deal with the issue. A 
theoretical example could be one in which WTO and NAFTA obligations differed, and 
depending on the issue, the domestic industry could make use of different provisions in a tactical 
way. 
 Third, the parties should ask whether the nature of the case lends itself more to the WTO 
or NAFTA fora. If an issue is very technical, it may be more efficiently dealt with in a more 
structured WTO approach. There may be cases in which there has been a complete diplomatic 
impasse and the parties require an impartial adjudicatory body to advise them with specifics on 
how to resolve their dispute. Using the WTO in such cases would be advantageous. Conversely, 
if the issue is more politically based, it should be negotiated in the NAFTA system instead of 
passing the buck to a formalized adjudicatory body to make political decisions. On the other 
hand, when a judicial body is forced to make political decisions, its credibility can come into 
question. Furthermore, noncompliance, particularly in politically sensitive matters, injures the 
effectiveness and credibility of enforcement for both institutions. 
 Fourth, the parties need to take into account to what extent they want the outcome of the 
case to affect broader international policy. As discussed above in the context of the Canada – 
Periodicals case, if any of the NAFTA countries wants to make an international example out of 
challenging another Party’s domestic provisions, the WTO is the better forum to do so. NAFTA 
rulings may serve to provide precedent within the regional trade agreement, but do not have 
further repercussions. The U.S. might be more motivated by whether the given issue affects U.S. 
policy in other countries than Canada would be. Thus, in general the U.S. might be more 
concerned with precedential value of decisions and would be more likely to choose the WTO.  
 Fifth, while retaliation is possible under both systems in cases of noncompliance, the 
parties may need to determine how much compensation they might seek. If the dollar amounts 
are very high, the WTO might be the better forum, while in the NAFTA retaliation measures are 
capped by WTO obligations. Although the general assumption among the parties is that 
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implementation will happen, the parties should take into account scenarios in which it might not 
and exercise foresight. 
 Sixth, the parties need to choose if they would like to reserve the option to appeal the 
panel decision which is only possible at the WTO. If, alternatively, the case seems clear legally 
and the complaining party determines that it wants the least institutional impediments to obtain 
compliance, it might be better served under the NAFTA. 
 Seventh, the parties need to examine the issue and determine in which forum they might 
be able to find the most impartial panelists. In the WTO, the parties can choose nationals from 
any part of the world to get the fairest hearing, although they cannot ensure this at the AB 
level.179 In the NAFTA, however, the panelists are citizens of the NAFTA countries. This might 
be helpful because NAFTA citizens may be better versed in NAFTA issues, but on the contrary 
the panelists may not be able to be de jure impartial. The U.S. has lost all of the three cases 
before the NAFTA Chapter 20 panels. Could this be the reason that there have been so few cases 
before NAFTA Chapter 20 panels and why the U.S. has not brought any cases after losing the 
first case it brought under the Chapter against Canada in 1996?180 
Finally, the use of the fora will also ultimately depend on the role that the parties see for 
each institution, respectively, in the present and in the future. Currently, as is apparent from the 
few cases brought under the NAFTA Chapter 20, one would argue that the role of Chapter 20 
proceedings is exclusively for the NAFTA specific disputes. Chapter 20 has a promising future 
to deal with issues that are not covered under the WTO, if the NAFTA covers new ground. North 
Americans may be able to use Chapter 20 to address disputes that arise out of North American 
issues, one being a North American approach to technical standards where North Americans may 
be able to agree. There may also be room for Chapter 20 in North American solutions to 
problems of economic integration – what the rest of the world may not be ready to do or may 
 
179 Some Washington lawyers have, for example, made an issue out of the fact that Mr. Taniguchi from Japan was 
the Presiding Member for the controversial Japan - Hot Rolled Steel decision. While in theory, panelists and AB 
members are supposed to be neutral and acting on their own accord, personal bias can perhaps never be remedied. 
180 Canadian Agricultural Products (CDA-95-2008-01); Panel decision, December 2, 1996. 
Leal-Arcas, Rafael  NAFTA-WTO 
 58
view as too intrusive, but what North Americans may find acceptable and needed. Some have 
argued that the Chapter 20 system makes sense in a bilateral setting, but not in the WTO where it 
may be too difficult to administer. So its effectiveness in the present and the future relies on 
diplomacy.   
 The future of WTO dispute settlement will depend on the quality of the work product and 
the impact of the decisions on domestic constituencies of the parties. The AB is acquiring 
increased credibility in the oversight of dispute settlement. With the new set of panelists and the 
change in leadership in the WTO Secretariat, the U.S. will probably be more inclined to take a 
wait-and-see approach. 
